Over the past half-century, Iran has implemented numerous policies and conducted extensive research aimed at curbing inflation; however, none have produced a lasting effect. Departing from previous approaches, which have typically been confined to measuring cause-and-effect relationships, this paper integrates the frameworks of institutional political economy, game theory, and Lacanian psychoanalysis. It argues that "inflation" in Iran is not an economic phenomenon governed by a defined mechanism, but rather an "empty signifier" anchored in an institutional void. In the absence of a "big Other" to serve as the guarantor of rules, this void transforms inflation into an instrument for rent redistribution and the reproduction of an exclusionary power structure. This dynamic subsequently shifts the collective action game from a "Stag Hunt" to a "Prisoner's Dilemma," thereby rendering productive cooperation impossible. The findings indicate that the persistence of inflation is not attributable to policy errors, but rather to a lock-in effect within the exclusionary institutional matrix and the asymmetrical distribution of power—factors that define the geometry of Iran's political economy and institutional development. Consequently, any anti-inflationary strategy that does not entail a transition toward inclusive, transparent, and accountable institutions is doomed to repeat the failures of the past.