Introduction

The foreign policies of Russia and China toward Iran’s nuclear program have been shaped by a complex interplay of strategic interests, normative commitments, and evolving international roles. This study applies Role Theory as an analytical framework to conduct a comparative examination of the two states’ approaches from the early 2000s to the present, situating their behavior within the broader context of international relations and great power politics. Role Theory, which emphasizes the socially constructed expectations of states’ positions and functions in the international system, provides a nuanced lens for understanding how Moscow and Beijing have defined, enacted, and adapted their foreign policy roles in relation to Iran’s nuclear dossier. By focusing on both self-ascribed roles (how each state perceives its own place in the system) and externally ascribed roles (how other actors expect them to behave), the analysis reveals the dynamic interaction between identity, interest, and structure in shaping policy outcomes.

Materials and Methods

The research draws on a qualitative comparative methodology, combining process tracing with content analysis of official statements, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports, and bilateral agreements. Primary sources include speeches by Russian and Chinese leaders, foreign ministry communiqués, and voting records in multilateral forums. Secondary sources encompass scholarly works on Role Theory, great power politics, and the geopolitics of the Middle East. The temporal scope covers key phases of the Iranian nuclear issue: the initial revelations of undeclared nuclear activities (2002–2005), the escalation of sanctions and negotiations (2006–2013), the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) period (2015–2018), and the post-U.S. withdrawal era (2018–2024). Analytical coding was applied to identify recurring role conceptions—such as “responsible great power,” “balancer,” “strategic partner,” and “guardian of sovereignty”—and to trace their operationalization in policy decisions.

Discussion & Result

The findings indicate that Russia’s foreign policy toward Iran’s nuclear program has been characterized by a dual role conception: as a “great power balancer” seeking to counter U.S. dominance while maintaining leverage over Iran, and as a “responsible stakeholder” in the non-proliferation regime. Moscow’s approach has oscillated between cooperation with Western powers in imposing limited sanctions and strategic alignment with Tehran in resisting excessive pressure. This duality reflects Russia’s desire to preserve its influence in the Middle East, protect its nuclear technology export market, and assert its status as an indispensable diplomatic actor. The construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, Russia’s participation in the P5+1 negotiations, and its calibrated support for UNSC sanctions illustrate this balancing act. Role Theory helps explain how Russia’s self-image as a guarantor of strategic stability and its externally ascribed role as a veto-wielding UNSC member constrained and enabled its policy choices.
China’s policy, by contrast, has been anchored in the role conception of a “responsible rising power” committed to peaceful development, coupled with that of a “defender of sovereignty and non-interference.” Beijing has consistently emphasized diplomatic resolution, opposed unilateral sanctions, and sought to protect its expanding energy and trade relations with Iran. While China did support certain UNSC sanctions, it worked to dilute their scope and ensure exemptions for legitimate economic activities. Its engagement in the JCPOA negotiations reflected both its interest in upholding the multilateral non-proliferation regime and its desire to project an image of constructive global leadership. Role Theory elucidates how China’s self-ascribed identity as a champion of South–South cooperation and its externally ascribed role as a permanent UNSC member shaped its cautious, consensus-oriented diplomacy.
The comparative analysis reveals both convergences and divergences in the two states’ role enactments. Convergences include their shared opposition to the weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program, their insistence on Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and their resistance to U.S.-led unilateralism. Both leveraged their UNSC positions to influence the scope and timing of sanctions, and both used the Iranian issue as a platform to assert multipolarity in the international system. Divergences stem from differences in strategic priorities and role conceptions: Russia’s readiness to use the nuclear issue as a bargaining chip in its broader confrontation with the West contrasts with China’s preference for stability to safeguard economic interests. Russia’s more overt military and nuclear cooperation with Iran also stands in contrast to China’s lower-profile engagement, which has been more commercially driven.
The discussion situates these findings within the broader literature on Role Theory and great power behavior. It argues that role conceptions are not static but evolve in response to systemic changes, domestic imperatives, and interactions with other actors. For Russia, the deterioration of relations with the West after 2014 reinforced its balancer role and deepened its strategic partnership with Iran, particularly in the Syrian conflict. For China, the intensification of U.S.–China rivalry after 2018 has increased the salience of its sovereignty-defender role, but Beijing has remained cautious to avoid secondary sanctions and preserve its global economic networks. The Iranian nuclear issue thus serves as a microcosm of how great powers navigate competing role expectations in a contested international order.
The study also highlights the methodological value of Role Theory in comparative foreign policy analysis. By focusing on role conceptions and enactments, the framework captures the interplay between material interests and ideational factors, offering a richer explanation than purely realist or liberal approaches. It also underscores the importance of examining both self-ascribed and externally ascribed roles, as discrepancies between the two can generate policy tensions or opportunities for role negotiation. In the case of Russia and China, the partial alignment between their self-images and external expectations facilitated cooperation in the P5+1 framework, but divergences in strategic priorities limited the depth of their coordination.


Coclusion

In conclusion, the comparative analysis demonstrates that Russia’s and China’s foreign policies toward Iran’s nuclear program cannot be fully understood without considering the role conceptions that underpin their behavior. While both have sought to balance non-proliferation commitments with strategic and economic interests, their differing role identities have produced distinct patterns of engagement. Russia’s balancer–stakeholder duality has led to a more flexible, sometimes transactional approach, whereas China’s sovereignty-defender–responsible-power identity has fostered a more consistent, stability-oriented policy. These differences have implications for the future of multilateral diplomacy on Iran’s nuclear issue, particularly as global power shifts and regional dynamics evolve.
The study concludes that Role Theory offers a valuable tool for anticipating how Russia and China might respond to future developments, such as renewed negotiations, changes in Iran’s nuclear posture, or shifts in U.S. policy. Understanding their role conceptions can help policymakers design engagement strategies that align with these states’ self-perceptions and external expectations, thereby enhancing the prospects for cooperative solutions. The findings also contribute to the broader debate on the utility of Role Theory in explaining great power behavior in complex, multi-actor security issues.