نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی
موضوعات
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
Abstract
The lack of elite rotation in the political sphere of societies leads to the concentration of power and creates the ground for its misuse. Elite rotation not only leads to the strengthening of democracy and the fair distribution of power, but also has significant effects on the efficiency of the political system. The main question of the research is what obstacles play a role in the lack of rotation of political elites and ultimately the redistribution of political power in the Islamic Republic of Iran? The present article, using the descriptive-analytical research method and by examining the research variables and the relationships between them, as well as using Weber's bureaucratic theory, attempts to analyze the discussion of elite rotation in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The conclusion of the research shows that the lack of vertical rotation of political elites and the rotation of managers in the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran has weakened the redistribution of political power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Factors have been identified as obstacles that, if eliminated, will solve this problem.
Keywords: elite circulation, political power, distribution of power, Weber, Iran.
Introduction
The concept of "power" has been mentioned as a central concept of the political system, and in this regard, the question of power distribution has gained double importance. It is necessary for political power to be distributed in society in order to achieve political participation; in addition, this issue is essential for the implementation of religious democracy, which is one of the foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the most important issues related to the distribution of political power is the issue of elite circulation. The main goal of the research is to identify the obstacles to the circulation of political elites in the distribution of political power in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The present research aims to argue, by explaining in detail the relationship between elite circulation and political power redistribution, what obstacles cause the lack of circulation of political elites in Iranian political society and to what extent they affect the redistribution of political power in society. Despite previous research on political elites and the fair distribution of political power, which have examined each of these two concepts independently, there is a lack of comprehensive research in this regard. Therefore, this research aims to examine the role and impact of political elite turnover on the distribution of political power by examining presidential eras during the Islamic Republic.
Materials & Methods
Among the central concepts of the present article are "elite turnover", "manager turnover", and "power distribution". Elite turnover is the transfer of power between the ruling government elite and the waiting political elite. According to the theory of managerial turnover, management is limited to certain individuals and a meritocracy system does not prevail. The purpose of distributing political power is for all political elites to benefit from a certain amount of power. Weber called organizations that are based on rational principles and are governed by regulations "bureaucracy". In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the things that Weber describes as characteristics of the bureaucratic system are not only accepted, but also considered as values. As a result, using Weber's model helps us to reach a correct model in the governance style, and therefore, we have chosen Weber's bureaucratic model as the analysis model. This article, using the descriptive-analytical research method and examining the research variables and the relationships between them, attempts to analyze the discussion of elite circulation in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Discussion & Results
In order to preserve and support the elites, it is necessary to identify the obstacles to the lack of elite circulation in the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some of these obstacles include: 1. The ratio of structure and agent: The structure of the government in Iran is rentier, so that about 80 percent of the country's foreign exchange income is provided by the sale of oil. In Iran, when the government takes control of the majority of the wealth in society, it also gains the ground to control the sources of political, cultural, and social power of society. This process prevents the distribution of political power at the societal level. 2. The weak rule of rules in the Iranian employment system: In our country, rules play a weaker role than relationships. According to the results of the National Survey of Values and Attitudes, which was conducted in 1379 in 28 provincial centers and whose statistical population was 16,824 people, 83.3 percent believed that without an intermediary, their rights would be violated. 3. The weakness of active civil society in contemporary Iran: According to a survey, 81 percent of respondents did not consider any party close to their political positions, and 57 percent considered the activity of political parties in Iran to be of little use. 4. The absence of a meritocratic culture: In the Islamic Republic of Iran, we witness that political burnouts intend to return to the government management system for any reason and usually do not turn to other matters. According to the results of the National Values and Attitudes Survey conducted in 1379 and in 28 provincial centers, 52.3 percent believed that individual ability is not important in government recruitment.
Conclusion
Political elites are recruited and trained directly and indirectly in various centers and become non-ruling elites, expecting that if there is no legal path to gain political power, they will use illegal ways, given the level of influence they have in society. Therefore, governments are forced to design sufficient and legal paths for elite circulation. The conclusion of the research shows that the lack of vertical circulation of political elites and the rotation of managers instead in the political system of the Islamic Republic of Iran has weakened the redistribution of political power. Some structural problems and obstacles have led to this problem. In this article, some of these structural obstacles are examined using evidence from the post-Islamic Revolution governments.
کلیدواژهها English