جستارهای سیاسی معاصر

جستارهای سیاسی معاصر

صلح از طریق اشاعه بازاندیشی در بازدارندگی هسته‌ای در جهانی نابرابر

نوع مقاله : علمی-پژوهشی

نویسندگان
1 استادیار مطالعات تمدنی، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایران.
2 استادیار گروه علوم سیاسی، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایران
3 دانشجوی دکتری علوم سیاسی پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی
4 دانشجوی دکتری فرهنگ و ارتباطات، واحد تهران مرکز، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، تهران، ایران
10.30465/cps.2026.53086.3618
چکیده
نگارندگان این مقاله، فرض بنیادین رژیم جهانی منع اشاعه سلاح‌های هسته‌ای مبنی‌بر اینکه محدودسازی گسترش تسلیحات هسته‌ای به صلح منجر می‌شود را به چالش می‌کشند و در مقابل استدلال می‌کنند که بازدارندگی هسته‌ای مؤثرترین سازوکار برای حفظ حاکمیت ملی کشورها و جلوگیری از جنگ است. این پژوهش با اتکا به نظریه واقع‌گرایی، الگوهای بازدارندگی، و تحلیل تطبیقی گسترده مطالعات موردی، نشان می‌دهد که کشورهای فاقد سلاح هسته‌ای در معرض مداخلات خارجی، تغییر رژیم، و دیپلماسی قهری قرار گرفته‌اند. در مقابل، کشورهایی که به سلاح هسته‌ای مجهز بوده‌، موفق شده‌اند از تجاوز خارجی جلوگیری کنند. افزون بر این، قدرت‌های رقیب هسته‌ای، همواره از ورود به جنگ تمام‌عیار اجتناب کرده‌اند. این الگوها نشان می‌دهند که سلاح هسته‌ای حتی در میان دشمنان، سبب احتیاط و خویشتن‌داری راهبردی می‌شود و بازدارندگی را به نیرویی تثبیت‌کننده بدل می‌سازد. این مقاله با بهره‌گیری از روش‌شناسی کیفی تطبیقی، و با ترکیب رهگیری فرایند، تحلیل پویا، و تحلیل تطبیقی کیفی؛ سازوکارهای پیونددهنده توان هسته‌ای با صلح و مصونیت راهبردی را بررسی می‌کند. از منظر نظری، مفهوم «عدالت در اشاعه» را معرفی می‌کند؛ چارچوبی که به نقد نابرابری ساختاری نهفته در معاهده منع گسترش سلاح‌های هسته‌ای (NPT) می‌پردازد و از دسترسی تنظیم‌شده و مبتنی‌بر تهدید به بازدارندگی هسته‌ای برای دولت‌های آسیب‌پذیر دفاع می‌کند. در نهایت، این پژوهش استدلال می‌کند که صلح نه از رهگذر خلع سلاح یا اجماع هنجاری، بلکه از طریق تهدید معتبر به تلافی حاصل می‌شود.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

Peace through Proliferation Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence in an Unequal World

نویسندگان English

Seyed Yasser Jebraily 1
Ruhollah Solgi 2
Behnam Goudarzi 3
Mohammad Mahdi kheirjo 4
1 Assisstant Professor of Islamic Civilization Studies, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran
2 Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Institute of Humanities,Tehran, Iran
3 PhD student in political science, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies
4 PhD student in Culture and Communication, Central Tehran Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده English

Introduction
Since the beginning of the nuclear age, the international security order has been built upon the assumption that limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition for preserving global peace and security. This normative logic -embodied most prominently in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)- has shaped global nuclear governance for more than five decades. According to this dominant perspective, reducing the number of nuclear-armed states and preventing new actors from acquiring such weapons lowers the risks of war, miscalculation, and escalation.
However, contemporary empirical evidence reveals a growing gap between this normative logic and the realities of international politics. Numerous non-nuclear states -including those fully compliant with non-proliferation commitments- have experienced military intervention, regime change, and coercive diplomacy. In contrast, nuclear-armed states, even under conditions of isolation, hostility, or violations of other international norms, have largely avoided full-scale war and direct external intervention. Moreover, rival nuclear powers have consistently refrained from engaging in total war against one another.
These recurring patterns raise a fundamental question: Has the non-proliferation regime genuinely produced peace, or has it reproduced a form of structural inequality within the international security system?
This article challenges the foundational assumption of the global non-proliferation regime -that restricting nuclear weapons leads to peace- and instead argues that nuclear deterrence constitutes the most effective mechanism for preserving national sovereignty and preventing war. The study advances a central hypothesis: nuclear deterrence, rather than disarmament or non-proliferation, is the primary factor preventing large-scale war and external military intervention in the contemporary international system.
Theoretically, the article introduces the concept of “Justice in Proliferation”, a framework that critiques the structural inequality embedded in the NPT and defends regulated, threat-based access to nuclear deterrence for vulnerable states.

Materials and Methods
This research employs a qualitative and comparative methodology grounded in structural realism, nuclear deterrence theory, and institutional critique of international regimes. The analytical framework assumes that in an anarchic international system, security is determined primarily by power balances and cost–benefit calculations rather than by legal norms or moral consensus.
Methodologically, the study combines:
· Process tracing to identify causal mechanisms linking nuclear capability to security outcomes
· Comparative dynamic case studies
· Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA)
Data were collected from official documents, historical records, international relations scholarship, and documented case studies.
The empirical analysis compares the experiences of non-nuclear states -including Iraq, Libya, Ukraine, Syria, and Afghanistan- with patterns of interaction among rival nuclear powers. The conceptual model defines:
· Independent Variable: Nuclear capability
· Intervening Variable: Credible nuclear deterrence
· Contextual Variable: Structural inequality within the international system and the NPT regime
· Dependent Variable: War, military intervention, or preservation of peace
The model posits that possession of nuclear weapons increases the cost of external intervention to prohibitive levels, thereby generating strategic immunity.

Discussion & Result
The findings reveal a consistent empirical pattern:
1. Non-nuclear states, even when fully compliant with non-proliferation obligations, have remained vulnerable to coercive diplomacy, foreign intervention, and regime change.
2. Nuclear-armed states have demonstrated a significantly higher degree of strategic immunity, effectively deterring direct military aggression.
3. Rival nuclear powers have systematically avoided full-scale war, exhibiting strategic caution and restraint even in periods of severe crisis.
These patterns suggest that nuclear weapons -even among adversaries- induce caution and strategic self-restraint, transforming deterrence into a stabilizing force. The evidence challenges the normative assumption that disarmament inherently produces peace. Instead, peace appears closely associated with the presence of credible retaliatory capability.
Furthermore, the institutional structure of the NPT has created a formal security hierarchy distinguishing between “nuclear-weapon states” and “non-nuclear-weapon states.” This differentiation has contributed to structural inequality, wherein strategic immunity is concentrated among recognized nuclear powers. The continued modernization of nuclear arsenals and limited progress toward disarmament reinforce this asymmetry.
The concept of Justice in Proliferation emerges as a theoretical contribution aimed at addressing this imbalance. It argues that under conditions of structural inequality, denying vulnerable states access to credible deterrence may perpetuate insecurity rather than reduce it.

Conclusion
This study concludes that peace in the contemporary international system is achieved not primarily through disarmament or normative consensus, but through credible threats of retaliation. Nuclear deterrence functions as a powerful mechanism for preserving sovereignty, preventing external intervention, and reducing the likelihood of full-scale war between major powers.
While the global non-proliferation regime seeks to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in the name of peace, empirical patterns suggest that strategic stability has been more closely associated with deterrence than with disarmament. The findings call for a critical reassessment of the structural inequalities embedded in the current regime and invite further theoretical and empirical debate on the relationship between nuclear capability, justice, and peace in international security.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Nuclear deterrence
non-proliferation regime
nuclear weapons
proliferation justice
NPT
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